Evidence has accrued that tacit knowledge is personal and ineffable as proposed by Polanyi (1958). Proponents of this view do not explain the mechanism responsible for the proliferation of tacit knowledge. This paper introduces a cognitive perspective to the process of tacit knowledge proliferation while maintaining that tacit knowledge is personal, ineffable and context-specific. Three propositions are discussed: tacit knowledge is episodic, thus personal, context-specific and acquired through experience; experience results from the construction or relating of episodes, but does not necessarily result in specifically 'intended' tacit knowledge; and the proliferation of tacit knowledge within an organization is the result of a constructive and collaborative process. The crux of this perspective has three assumptions: constructing and relating of tacit knowledge is episodic, constructing new episodes is obligatory upon attention, and relating to past episodes is obligatory upon attention.
Recent academic interest in the age-old concept of knowledge creation and sharing within the field of organization science was ignited by the works of several researchers and has resulted in a knowledge-based perspective of the firm (Drucker 1988; Nonaka 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1994, 1995; Grant 1996; Davenport and Prusak 1998; Tsoukas and Mylonopolous 2004) . This perspective focuses on gaining a competitive advantage through the timely application of codified/explicit and personal/tacit knowledge (Nonaka 1991; Brown and Duguid 2000) . The foundation of this line of research is composed of the tacit-explicit distinction and the process of knowledge-conversion.
In their SECI model, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) propose that knowledge is converted via a spiraling process of sharing and reflection, composed of internalization (conversion of explicit-to-tacit knowledge), socialization (conversion of tacit-to-tacit knowledge), externalization (conversion of tacit-to-explicit knowledge) and combination (conversion of explicit-to-explicit knowledge). However, a counter-argument questions the validity of knowledge conversion (Tsoukas 2003) . Drawing on Shotter and Katz's (1996) Wittgensteinian psychology, Tsoukas (2003) posits a mechanism of attention-drawing by which individuals are cued by or to specific stimuli that are then interpreted and personalized. Tsoukas assumes that tacit knowledge is ineffable and is acquired only through 'numberless experiences' (Tsoukas 1996: 17) , thus not convertible to explicit knowledge as described by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) . Tsoukas concludes: ' Tacit knowledge has been greatly misunderstood in management studies … Nonaka and Takeuchi's interpretation of tacit knowledge as knowledge-not-yet-articulated -knowledge awaiting for its "translation" or "conversion" into explicit knowledge -an interpretation that has been widely adopted in management studies, is erroneous: it ignores the essential ineffability of tacit knowledge, thus reducing it to what can be articulated.' (Tsoukas 1996: 425) Tsoukas goes on to conclude that 'tacit knowledge cannot be captured, translated, or converted, but only displayed and manifested, in what we do' (Tsoukas 1996: 426) .
Evidence has accrued that is consistent with this perspective. For example, in contrast to the perspective of knowledge introduced by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) , some research suggests that knowledge is more episodic or personal and the conversion process is more deliberate and dependent upon attention (Logan 1988 (Logan , 1992 Vokey and Brooks 1994; Whittlesea and Dorken 1993; Dienes and Fahey 1995; Logan et al. 1996; Logan 1997; Perruchet and Gallego 1997; D'Eredita and Hoyer 1999) . Unlike that of Nonaka and Takeuchi, however, the perspective offered by Tsoukas (2003) does not explicate the mechanism responsible for the proliferation of tacit knowledge, given its ineffable, or personal, quality.
Proliferation is the growth of tacit knowledge through an obligatory and continuous process of construction of episodes. Below, we introduce a cognitive perspective that lends insight into the process of tacit knowledge proliferation while maintaining the viewpoint that tacit knowledge is ineffable. This perspective challenges currently held assumptions about tacit knowledge as exemplified by Nonaka (1991) . We extend the notion of attention-drawing (Tsoukas 2003) by describing it in greater detail and show how it results in the proliferation of tacit knowledge.
Two Camps, Three Gaps
As introduced above, two camps have emerged in regard to the inquiry of the proliferation of tacit knowledge.
Knowledge Conversion: Camp 1
One camp views tacit knowledge to proliferate via a process of conversion between tacit and explicit knowledge and is exemplified by the works of Nonaka and others (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1994, 1995; Davenport and Prusak 1998; Brown and Duguid 2000) . The transformation of knowledge between explicit and tacit states has been coined as knowledge conversion (Nonaka 1991) and is derived from the 'adaptive character of thought' model (ACT) (Anderson 1983) . Anderson proposes two forms of knowledge: declarative knowledge, expressible through propositions and facts, and procedural knowledge, expressible through actions such as riding a bike. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1994) link notions of explicit knowledge to those of declarative knowledge and notions of tacit knowledge to those of procedural knowledge by directly associating the manner of expression that is connected with each form of knowledge.
Similar to Anderson, Nonaka and Takeuchi account for the unidirectional conversion of explicit-to-tacit knowledge. For example, a piano student's explicit knowledge of the location of the keys eventually converts into tacit knowledge of how to play the piano. The SECI model extends the ACT model by accounting for the process by which the tacit knowledge of the piano teacher converts to the tacit knowledge of the student and the process by which the tacit knowledge of the student converts to explicit knowledge codified within, perhaps, an instructional book on how to play the piano. For example, the explicit knowledge encoded in a book can be combined with other explicit knowledge, internalized through practice to become tacit knowledge and eventually socialized into tacit knowledge through instruction, and so on. It is assumed that knowledge is deepened as it proliferates in this manner.
Attention-drawing: Camp 2
The second camp is exemplified by the works of Tsoukas and colleagues (Tsoukas 2003; Tsoukas and Mylonopolous 2004) who view knowledge conversion to be a misleading metaphor. Tsoukas argues that tacit knowledge is non-convertible. He interprets Polyani's (1958) seminal work on tacit knowledge as referencing knowledge that is truly personal, thus ineffable and forever tacit. Knowledge is also viewed as practical since it relates to context-specific skills. Tsoukas (2003) suggests that knowledge is best understood as an 'unarticulated background in which we dwell' (personal) that is acquired through 'numberless experiences' (practical) (Tsoukas 2003: 17) .
A literal interpretation of this perspective would position every individual in a solitary world, armed with practical knowledge that allows her to get things done, albeit too personal to be truly shared with others. If one agrees with the practical nature of tacit knowledge in regard to an individual, one must also recognize its practical nature in regard to its social function. Tsoukas responds to this by positing an attention-drawing mechanism. Attention-drawing is a process by which knowledgeable individuals direct the attention of others to salient stimuli that work to characterize a specific experience (Tsoukas 2003) . Attention-drawing is therefore the process by which tacit knowledge proliferates.
Such experiences can involve the use of a tool like a stick-shift car (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005) . In time, the amount of attention one pays to the action of pushing on the gas pedal while releasing the clutch diminishes as attention moves to the specific movement of the car. In the case of a student-driver, an instructor who is assumingly adept in driving might direct the attention of the student-driver to the relationship between the gas pedal and the clutch. In time, the nuances of this relationship become more peripheral, or tacit, to the student, thus allowing the instructor to draw the student's attention to the acceleration of the car as opposed to the gas-clutch relationship. Nonaka (1991) . 2 The nature of experience: Assuming knowledge is acquired through experience (Tsoukas 1996) , what is the nature of experience? This refers to the acquisition/construction of knowledge without offering any insight into the nature of this process. 3 The role of attention-drawing in knowledge proliferation: Assuming knowledge is passed on via a process of attention-drawing (Tsoukas 2003) , what is the mechanism responsible for this action? It is important not only to imply the process but also to posit a mechanism that can be validated. Otherwise it will forever remain a philosophical question.
We posit the following when addressing each of these gaps:
1 The nature of tacit knowledge is episodic, thus personal, context-specific and acquired through experience. 2 Experience results from the construction and relating of episodes, but does not necessarily result in specifically 'intended' tacit knowledge. 3 The proliferation of tacit knowledge within an organization is the result of a constructive and collaborative process by which two or more individuals collectively focus attention, thus collectively construct relatable episodes.
We elaborate on each of these three propositions below. We next introduce an episodic-based perspective of tacit knowledge. We then illustrate how the construction of episodes leads to what is commonly referred to as experience. We then present three core assumptions of an episodic perspective and show how the construction of episodes, experience and attention relate in a manner that allows tacit knowledge to proliferate. Finally, we discuss the value of this perspective for organizational science by illustrating how it scales to the group level.
Using Episodes to Probe the Nature of Tacit Knowledge
We extend Tsoukas' (1996) position by positing that the 'unarticulated background in which we dwell', or tacit knowledge, is episodic in nature. Human cognitive processes enable sense to be made (Weick 1995) by parsing endless streams of information into episodes that are defined as follows:
'Processing episodes consist of the goal the subject was trying to attain, the stimuli encountered in pursuit of that goal, the interpretation given to the stimuli with respect to the goal, and the response made to the stimulus.' (Logan 1988: 495) Episodes imply that individuals interpret stimuli in a manner that makes personal sense, given a specific context. This personal and context-specific quality of episodes need not imply that tacit knowledge is transparent or effable (Tsoukas 1996) . It need only imply that tacit knowledge is interpreted (Weick 1995) , or constructed, within the context of a goal and an associated response which in practice translates to concrete action (Weick and Roberts 1993) . The interpretation and meaning associated with each episode is truly personal. Thus, it is obligatory that the sense made is meaningful in some way to the individual doing the sensemaking. We assume that tacit knowledge is constructed à la Weick (1995) : ' The process of sensemaking is intended to include the construction and bracketing of the text-like cues that are interpreted, as well as the revision of those interpretations based on action and its consequences. Sensemaking is about authoring as well as interpretation, creation as well as discovery.' (Weick 1995: 8) Weick (1995) explains that cues are constructed and often 'singled out from an ongoing flow of experience' (Weick 1995: 8) . Weick also explains 'how the interpretation and meanings of these cues were then altered and made more explicit and sensible, as a result of "concrete activities"' (Weick 1995: 8) . The numberless experiences posited by Tsoukas (1996) are -we believe more accurately understood to be -numberless episodes that are tied together to form an ongoing flow of experience (Weick 1995) .
The personal quality of tacit knowledge has been argued for by Tsoukas (2003) . Thus, we assume that tacit knowledge is personal and move on to directly address the context-specific nature of tacit knowledge as it relates to the notion of episodes. In the next section, we address the validity of this perspective and the appropriateness of assuming tacit knowledge to be episodic.
The Context-specific Nature of Tacit Knowledge Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) claim that tacit knowledge is context-specific. However, they also allude that tacit knowledge is abstract in nature. For example, they propose that while tacit knowledge is composed of personal and concrete know-how, it is also composed of mental models and schemata (Bartlett 1932; Craik 1943; Kaplan 1964; Minsky 1975; Johnson-Laird 1983) . The latter claim implies that tacit knowledge can exist void of context, in mind. Thus, it is not necessarily limited by context in application. The former claim implies a direct dependence on context. Specifically, Nonaka and Takeuchi define tacit knowledge as involving:
'both cognitive and technical elements. The cognitive elements center on … "mental models" in which human beings form working models of the world by creating and manipulating analogies in their minds. These working models include schemata, paradigms, beliefs, and viewpoints that provide "perspectives" that help individuals to perceive and define their world. By contrast, the technical element of tacit knowledge covers concrete know-how, crafts, and skills that apply to specific contexts.' (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995: 16). This juxtaposition is troubling because the underlying assumptions of each element are diametrically opposed. If tacit knowledge implies abstraction, then one cannot assume the same knowledge to be fundamentally context-specific, and vice versa. This notion of abstract mental models and schemata is fundamental to the knowledge conversion process. However, critics point to the lack of consistency in terminology, a lack of reliability in measurement, and a lack of validating measurement, as evidence that these notions are problematic (Borgman 1999; Dahlin 2001) . Although it is difficult to reliably pit these notions against a more episode-based framework, it is possible to challenge the fundamental assumption of abstraction upon which theories of mental models are built. It is assumed that individuals naturally abstract knowledge across various experiences and that this tacit knowledge is structured in the form of a working model that can be applied across contexts.
Researchers have presented evidence for cognitive mechanisms that are capable of abstracting knowledge from a given set of stimuli (Berry and Broadbent 1988; Berry and Dienes 1991; Dienes et al. 1991; Reber 1993; Berry 1997; Knowlton and Squire 1996; Lewicki et al. 1997; Stadler and Frensch 1998; Dienes and Perner 1999) . In addressing the nature of knowledge, cognitive researchers have employed artificial grammar tasks where participants memorize a series of letter strings governed by an underlying grammar or rule in a learning phase and later judge the grammaticality of a set of strings with different surface elements (i.e. letters) that either follow the same grammar or not in a testing phase (Reber 1993) . In the learning phase, participants were instructed to memorize and were not told of any underlying grammar. Within the testing phase, they were instructed to make a grammatical judgment on each string. Each stimulus had a 50% chance of either conforming to this grammar, or not. Performance that was better than chance in terms of accuracy (60-70% in practice) combined with the participant's inability to explicitly recall specific stimuli in a post-testing phase was interpreted as evidence for the acquisition -thus existence -of abstract (tacit) knowledge.
Such research, however, has been challenged by others who have shown that results can be both accounted for and more accurately predicted by an episodic account (Perruchet et al. 1992; Vokey and Brooks 1994; Whittlesea and Dorken 1993; Dienes and Fahey 1995; Perruchet and Gallego 1997; D'Eredita and Hoyer 1999) . These studies show that manipulating the underlying relationships among stimuli manipulates the number of specific co-occurrences of surface elements to which a participant is exposed. Performance was shown to be more reliably based on the actual number of reoccurrences of specific episodes of stimuli in the learning phase. Participants were unable to recall specific episodes in the testing phase, but were directly affected by the number of exposures to each co-occurrence, or episode, in a predictable manner.
A Social-cognitive Perspective of Tacit Knowledge Lave (1988) presents a social-cognitive perspective that also calls into question the notion of mental abstraction in regard to deep (tacit) knowledge and learning transfer. Lave observed that classroom mathematics was built on the assumption that knowledge was abstract, or in her terms, the assumption that 'learning transferred' from the classroom to more applied settings such as the grocery store. This is similar to the framework presented above in which there are learning and testing phases in which the researcher tests the learning transferred from one phase to the next. She observed that the mathematics taught in classrooms was different than that practiced in grocery stores because the structure of the context-specific problems in grocery stores was inherently different than those taught in classrooms. She observed that the differences in contexts between classrooms and grocery stores significantly hindered learning transfer. She specifically showed that when selecting items based on optimal price, most participants simply relied on past choices and experiences (or episodes) specific to each item and the grocery store setting as opposed to any tacit-like knowledge of how to calculate price that might be acquired in the classroom.
This work laid the foundation for Lave and Wenger's (1991) notions of situated learning and legitimate peripheral participation as it relates to apprenticeship. Tacit knowledge or knowledge conversion are rarely used terms in this stream of research. Such research, however, focuses on tacit knowledge proliferation and suggests its inextricable link to context (Østerlund 1996) .
Findings from other streams of research have also shown learning transfer to be less seamless across contexts than intuition would suggest. For example, relatively disparate streams of research on expertise (Ericsson 1996) , creativity as a process (Weisberg 1993) , automaticity (Wyer 1997) and reliable social systems (Weick and Roberts 1993) have all emphasized the context-specific nature of knowledge. Each stream of research deals with similar behaviors by exploring the reasons behind elevated levels of human performance that are presumably anchored by the tacit knowledge of individuals. We view these findings to be beyond coincidence. It is validating since disparate streams of research on similar human behaviors have similar implications in regard to context, thereby working to validate the proposition that tacit knowledge is context-specific. The next section addresses the second gap by describing the links among episodes, experience and tacit knowledge.
The Relationship between Experience and Tacit Knowledge
We continue on the premise that tacit knowledge is episodic in nature. Now, we explore the premise that tacit knowledge is acquired through experience (Tsoukas 2003) and that experience results from the construction of and relationship between episodes. Tsoukas's (2003) interpretation of Polyani (1958) includes an explanation of how salience of specific stimuli changes with one's goals and experience. When one starts to use a tool, one's attention is on the sensations specific to the tool; the goal is to learn how to use it. One is peripherally attentive to the goal trying to be accomplished through the use of the tool.
As previously illustrated, a student-driver's focal attention is initially on the mechanics of the car, but such mechanics become peripheral when a significant amount of driving experience is acquired (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005) . Her goal while first learning how to drive a stick-shift car might be to determine the workings of the clutch with the gas pedal. As she gains experience with these, she is able to alter the goal to accelerating the car. Conversely, the instructor is forced to refocus her attention on how to interact with the mechanics of the car (how it feels, how to move) and reflect upon her own experiences when teaching the student-driver. Stimuli that would be peripheral to the instructor whose goal is to drive the car become focal to the instructor whose goal now becomes teaching the student-driver. In the latter case, the instructor is forced to focus attention on what is most pertinent to teaching the student-driver and reflect on automated skills (Wyer 1997) and the sensations associated with these actions.
Here the student-driver learns how to drive while the instructor teaches how to drive. Both the instructor and student-driver, however, are constructing new episodes, relating previously constructed episodes, and expressing tacit knowledge through action. The student-driver is focused on constructing relatively unique episodes while the instructor is focused on leveraging past episodes specific to teaching someone how to drive a car. A less experienced instructor will rely on episodes specific only to driving as opposed to episodes specific to teaching someone how to drive. The degree to which each of them can rely on past episodes or has to construct relatively new episodes directly depends upon the similarity between past goals, stimuli, interpretations of those stimuli and response and current goals, stimuli, interpretations of those stimuli and responses.
Recall that processing episodes is assumed to 'consist of the goal the subject was trying to attain, the stimuli encountered in pursuit of that goal, the interpretation given to the stimuli with respect to the goal, and the response made to the stimulus' (Logan 1988: 495) . These four characteristics are directly tied to each other in regard to a single episode and each component is directly dependent on the other three for meaning. Thus, episodes are related by goals, stimuli, interpretation and/or responses. Consequently, we assume that the world as we remember it to be (the past), as we perceive it to currently be (the present) and as we envision it to be (the future) is a world of seemingly seamless episodes intricately woven by goals, stimuli, interpretations and/or responses/actions.
Past episodes aid in the construction of new episodes as they work to direct attention, aid in the interpretation of stimuli, and aid in the choice of response, given the perceived goal. The construction of episodes results in knowledge of what stimuli are salient, given a goal. The instructor knows what is or is not salient and relies on this knowledge when directing the attention of the student-driver. Eventually, the student-driver gains enough driving experience to also reliably drive a car. This is the process of attention-drawing (Tsoukas 2003 ) that allows for the proliferation of tacit knowledge. The mechanism responsible for attentiondrawing and the proliferation of tacit knowledge is discussed in more detail in the following section. Before this can be discussed, however, it is important to clarify how discrete episodes combine to form a stream of experience.
The Flow of Experience: The Constructing and Relating of Episodes
Assuming numberless experiences are required for any individual seeking tacit knowledge and that experience is the construction of and relation between episodes does not offer us much insight into the ongoing flow of experience. How, exactly, do discrete episodes allow for a seemingly fluid flow of experiences?
This results from the overlap in episodes in regard to its characteristics as discussed earlier. One would be unable to make sense of the newly constructed episode if this was not true (Weick 1995) . For example: 1 A new episode might be associated with past episodes because of a similar inherent goal, but the stimuli attended to, interpretation of these stimuli, and response to such stimuli might contradict previous action. This type of incongruity results in the most obvious need for sensemaking (Weick 1995) . It presents the need for constructing a potentially unique episode that is congruent enough for it to be associated with past episodes; or, for it to make sense. This is not an abstraction, but a direct comparison made by humancognitive systems. Episodes are explicitly related or not explicitly related in some manner. However, in the latter case, past episodes most likely continue to indirectly influence behavior whether individuals are aware of this influence or not (Reder 1996) . 2 On the other hand, a new episode might reinforce a past episode because of similar goals, stimuli attended to, interpretations and/or responses. Here, one can assume a high probability that newly constructed episodes will be related to past episodes. Unlike the previous case, the amount of effort required to make sense of an episode is minimal, thus allowing for specific stimulus-response behavior to be optimally reinforced (Wyer 1997) . 3 A new episode might also fall between the two extremes. This is perhaps the gray area in which one is said to rely upon the mental models and concrete know-how referenced by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) in their view of tacit knowledge. Here, one is simply afforded the chance to do less sensemaking than in the first case presented while also being able to leverage an array of past episodes that are similar in goals, stimuli attended to, interpretations and/or responses.
A robust cognitive system emerges if we assume tacit knowledge is episodic and experience is the construction of and relationship between episodes. This allows individuals to be practical and 'reliable' (Weick and Roberts 1993) in regard to action. This, however, is not meant to suggest that all experience leads to the originally intended tacit knowledge. Episodes may be constructed, given specific experiences within a particular context, but not necessarily in a manner that makes them representative of an array of potential contingencies.
For example, the presence of a master/teacher increases the chance that the experiences of an apprentice will result in the construction of necessary episodes since the master/teacher both directs the apprentice's attention to the salient stimuli and helps relate these episodes in a manner which artfully leverages previous experience. In the case where a master/teacher is not present, an apprentice is left to experience and construct episodes in a manner which may not effectively leverage previous experience, thus leading to reduced optimization in constructing tacit knowledge in regard to associated actions within the specific context. This occurs because the intended actions, goals and their relationship to each other which are recognizable by the master are relatively unknown to the apprentice. This latter case leaves the apprentice to operate in more of a trial-and-error manner, thus potentially requiring more experience than the apprentice who benefits from having a master/teacher and/or some luck in regard to how episodes are constructed and related (for example, similar to the way hints and clues guide an individual to the completion of a crossword puzzle).
This would also require some type of system that allows for self-monitoring and for performance to be compared to either previous performance and/or an intended goal (for example, an athlete might be afforded this opportunity given the chance to directly compare herself to the competition or by using objective metrics such as time, speed, and so on). This situates behavior as more of a probabilistic event that is based on the number of related episodes constructed, or the amount of related experience, given a specific context and amount of experience within that context. Thus, part of the role of the master is to help increase the probability of specific actions of the apprentice, given a finite amount of experience within a specific context, so that knowledge becomes tacit and behavior within that context becomes reliable.
In the following section, we discuss the mechanism responsible for attention-drawing.
Drawing Attention to Attention-drawing: A Mechanism for the Proliferation of Tacit Knowledge
There is much research on automaticity within the cognitive psychology literature (Wyer 1997) . This research directly addresses the issues in context-specific knowledge which is viewed as tacit or, in cognitive psychology terms, automatic. Although not presented within this literature as being tacit knowledge, the type of knowledge addressed is tacit in nature and much like the context-specific knowledge referred to in the earlier quote taken from Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) .
The knowledge of how to work the gas and the clutch of a car, or how to hit a nail with a hammer, are actions that would be assumed to be the technical element of tacit knowledge. Nonaka refers directly to this line of research when referencing the work of Anderson (1983) . Although Nonaka correctly characterizes this research as solely focusing on the unidirectional construction of knowledge, he is remiss in assuming that the mechanisms identified from this research do not support the proliferation of knowledge. As we will now discuss, robust findings beyond those presented by Anderson have emerged across the past two decades that uncover episode-based mechanisms and are scalable to a social level.
Three Core Assumptions
In the instance theory of automaticity (ITA), Logan (1988) assumes that individuals acquire knowledge through the acquisition of experiences, or episodes, which he characterizes as instances. The notion of instances allows researchers to better understand the cognitive-based construction of knowledge, but no more so than the general notion of episodes. Thus, we will continue to use the term episode to ensure continuity as we juxtapose ITA with the notions put forth above and present a mechanism responsible for the proliferation of tacit knowledge (Logan 1988 (Logan , 1992 (Logan , 1997 Logan et al. 1996; D'Eredita and Hoyer 1999) .
Adopted from ITA's core assumptions of episode-based memory, obligatory encoding, and obligatory retrieval (Logan 1988) , the crux of our perspective is comprised of three basic assumptions, the first of which has been discussed at length above. We now present it as one of three related assumptions and include research results which work to further validate our claim:
Assumption 1: The constructing and relating of tacit knowledge is episodic
Each episode is associated with one or more previous episodes, but is processed as a separate co-occurrence.
Much research has tested and validated this and the next two assumptions. Several studies (Logan 1988 (Logan , 1992 (Logan , 1997 have shown that one can account for the ubiquitous power law of practice (Newell and Rosenbloom 1981) when analyzing knowledge from an episodic perspective. Specifically, such research shows that the rate of increase in performance is the same as the rate of decrease in the variability of that performance when experience is measured in terms of the number of processed episodes. Performance and the variability in performance are proportional to the number of processed episodes and shown to be adequately modeled by the learning curve (Logan 1988) . For example, a more complex task often implies a longer amount of time before a level of high performance is reached. Time, however, is less of a contributing independent variable than the number of processed episodes. Performance will be dependent upon the number of processed episodes as opposed to the amount of time spent on a given task, or the amount of information to which one is exposed.
Furthermore, when complexity (for example, the number of items to be learned) was controlled for, performance on all tasks was directly comparable when the independent variable was the number of processed episodes as opposed to the length of time one was exposed to the task (Logan 1988; Lee and Anderson 2001) . It took more time on the complex task than the simple task to reach a given level of performance, but it did not necessarily require more episodes on a stimulus/component basis. More complex tasks required more components to be learned and this required exposure to an increased number of stimuli (Lee and Anderson 2001) . Episodes were controlled for and were assumed to be identified by the presentation of a stimulus and the response associated with that stimulus. The discreteness and relatedness of episodes is directly dependent on attention, which leads us to assumptions 2 and 3.
Assumption 2: Constructing new episodes is obligatory upon attention
That which is attended to is automatically processed as an episode.
We are presented with a seamless stream of information everyday. We cannot process it all. Thus, we filter the information, and interpret/construct meaning in a manner that makes sense to us. Our senses interface with the world in which we are embedded, but what we experience is limited to only that which we pay attention to (Logan and Etherton 1994) . For example, you may now be seated on a chair, or prone on a couch. Pressure is being exerted on your body as a result of the furniture producing a counter-gravitational force. Pressure is likely felt on the back of your upper thigh, your tailbone, or perhaps the side of your body if you are lying down. Was that pressure there before? Yes. Were you sensing it? Perhaps, but the episodes specific to the pressure just attended to exist simply because you have attended to them. This is what is meant when it is assumed that the construction of episodes is obligatory upon attention. Which stimuli one attends to leads to the interpretation of those stimuli, and a response that one must make sense out of, given past episodes.
Assumption 2 has been validated by studies which controlled for where participants chose to focus their attention (Logan et al. 1996) . For example, participants were presented with word pairs which consisted of one word being presented above another word in the center of a screen and were asked to determine whether or not a target word(s) appeared upon each presentation. Although participants were presented with more than one stimulus, they were asked to attend to, for example, only the words in green print. The words in green were either continuously or randomly paired with other words printed in either green or red. This allowed for the possibility of constructing co-occurrences that include non-target words since they were presented in close proximity to and in the same manner as target words. Also, based on the location of the non-target words, it could be assumed that these words were within the focal range of vision of each participant. Results showed that performance was associated with only those words participants were instructed to attend to and that an episode could be composed of either a single word with a target color or an association between two words with a target color depending upon how divided one's attention was. These results suggest that attention has more of an impact on what we learn as opposed to with what we are presented.
Assumption 3: Relating to past episodes is obligatory upon attention
That which is attended to cues goals, stimuli, interpretations of those stimuli, and/or actions/responses that compose previously processed episodes. Previously processed episodes directly impact performance if a current cue is attended to and associated with past episodes in some way (Logan 1988) .
What about the information of the other stimuli in the room in which you sit? You might pick something meaningful to you. A picture, perhaps? Truly attending to this leads you to reflect upon past episodes. You are constructing a new episode as just assumed, but the construction of this episode is heavily influenced by past episodes that are obligatorily being processed. Thus, the relating of past episodes in regard to current goals, stimuli, interpretations and/or responses is obligatory upon attention.
Assumption 3 is supported by empirical evidence which suggests that a race between automatic and algorithmic processing occurs before a response is made (Logan 1988 (Logan , 1992 . It has been shown that when first presented with a novel task, a participant's performance is based on more basic, algorithmic-like processing. Here, one relies on significantly different past episodes to interpret relatively novel stimuli. This performance has a higher probability of being based on direct, automatic performance as the number of context-specific episodes increases. Logan (1988 Logan ( , 1992 employed a task called alphabet-arithmetic. For example, participants were asked to determine if the statement 'A + 3 = D' (where 3 is the addend) is true or not. The correct response would be true, because if you 'add' three letters to A you end up at D in the alphabet. As expected, response time increased as the addend increased. This relationship, though, was evident only at the beginning of the training as participants eventually constructed enough episodes of 'A + 3 = D' to allow for automatic performance. One can imagine first viewing the performance of an individual trained on this task and trying to keep up. Similar to how tacit knowledge is often viewed, if one was not appreciative of the previous experience, one might be inclined to conclude that this individual has an abstract tacit knowledge base that allows her to perform flawlessly at alphabet-arithmetic even though her performance was directly tied to context-specific experience.
Again, the point where a past episode ends and a new episode begins is nebulous because we perceive a stream of experience. Yet, we can make experience more discrete than seamless. Think back to the episode of attending to the pressure on your body and to the other episode of looking at the picture. Perhaps, once completed, you might reflect back on the episode of reading this paper. Here, the two episodes would blend into -or simply never be part of -the episode of reading this paper. How episodes relate to each other is relative to how or to where one focuses attention.
Exemplifying a Mechanism for the Proliferation of Tacit Knowledge
How does this cognitively based mechanism lend itself to the proliferation of knowledge? To illustrate, we will use the example popularized by Nonaka (1991) . Nonaka applies the example of the Matsushita Electric Company when illustrating his notion of knowledge-conversion within an organizational setting. Matsushita wanted to design bread machines equivalent to human bakers, particularly in kneading dough. For a reason that eluded developers, the machine produced dough that resulted in poorly baked bread. After a number of analyses, the designers decided to approach the problem differently. Their strategy involved having a Matsushita product developer apprentice with the head baker at the Osaka International Hotel, known for making the best bread in Osaka. The question was how does one convert the knowledge of an expert baker into knowledge that could be used by the developers at Matsushita?
Nonaka described the conversion of knowledge from being first socialized, then externalized, then combined, and then internalized. Socialization involved transferring the tacit knowledge of the head baker to that of the developer through the process of showing the developer how to knead bread. Externalization involved the developer converting her newly acquired tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge that could be embedded in the design of the machine. Combination involved the team of developers combining their explicit knowledge about product development with the explicit knowledge of kneading bread. Internalization involved the product team converting the newly created explicit knowledge into the tacit knowledge of how to design a bread-kneading machine.
This example of a product development team intent on building a breadmaking machine topically explains tacit knowledge proliferation and is potentially misleading. The reader has to believe that the head baker's knowledge was incorporated into the design of the bread machine (like a ghost in the machine) by converting tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge. Yet, Polyani's (1958) notion of tacit knowledge renders it forever personal, suggesting that this is not possible (Tsoukas 2003; Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos 2004) . In the case of tacit-to-explicit knowledge conversion, if we assume that tacit knowledge is truly personal, ergo ineffable, then we may also assume that tacit knowledge can be effectively shared, if at all, via highly dynamic interactions between those with specific tacit knowledge and those without (Brown and Duguid 2000; Tsoukas 2003) .
We have yet to answer the question in regard to the proliferation of tacit knowledge in a manner that is consistent with what we understand tacit knowledge to be. However, a mechanism for tacit knowledge proliferation does present itself if we simply scale the episodic-based mechanisms to the social level. It is difficult to delineate this mechanism as being either individual or social when applied to the issue of tacit knowledge proliferation. This is similar to Weick's (1995) view of sensemaking which he characterizes in the following way. 'Sensemaking is grounded in both individual and social activity, and whether the two are even separable … has been a durable tension in the human condition' (Weick 1995: 6) . We view tacit knowledge proliferation to have a similarly inherent tension in regard to the episodic-based mechanism presented here.
Fundamental to our argument, the mechanism responsible for the proliferation of tacit knowledge must incorporate the construction of episodes by new or inexperienced organizational members. We will recast Nonaka's example presented above within the episodic framework presented in this paper to illustrate both the mechanism and its scalability to the dyadic level.
The Proliferation of Tacit Knowledge at the Dyadic Level
The head baker needs to convey to the developer an unusual technique for kneading dough. Through application of assumption 1 above, the baker has constructed a large number of episodes specific to effectively or ineffectively kneading dough. These experiences were most likely accrued during an apprenticeship of some kind and her time as a baker. The baker has also constructed a large number of episodes specific to effectively or ineffectively explaining to others how to knead dough. These were most likely constructed while instructing her assistants or apprentices. She now needs to help the developer process episodes to reliably and consistently knead dough while minimizing the construction of episodes that will lead to poorly kneaded dough.
Given assumption 2 above, we presume that focusing attention in this manner will lead to the obligatory construction of the targeted episodes. The baker facilitates this process through demonstrations, stories, metaphors and/or explicit descriptions about what to do in the kneading process in order to direct the developer's attention to only the specific information salient to optimally kneading dough. The developer then works to construct the necessary episodes by focusing her cognitive system on only the types of stimuli and information that will afford her the specific experience of producing well-kneaded bread. In this case, the episodes would be composed of the goal of kneading the dough in a specific way (twisting and stretching), the salient stimuli (the dough and physical sensations associated with, for example, tactile sensations), the interpretation of these stimuli (consistency of the dough, outcomes in regard to 'right', 'wrong', 'better', 'worse', and so on), and the response or action of kneading dough in a specific manner.
The developer returns to Matsushita to then communicate her experiences to other developers once she has mastered kneading dough (given her relatively limited experience compared to the head baker, she will most likely not achieve the same level of skill). The information and the attentional cues she offers then enable other developers to construct the episodes specific to the design of a bread machine.
By applying assumption 3, we can assume that construction of the episodes will obligatorily relate to past episodes of each developer in regard to the goal of building a machine with movement that is, perhaps, elliptical and kneadinglike, stimuli similar in composition to dough and physical materials and arrangements with similarly required degrees of freedom, similar interpretations of these materials and their movements, and/or the responses to similar goals, stimuli and/or interpretations. This will happen during the explanations and demonstrations of the developer, turned pseudo-master bread kneader. It is in this manner that the attention-drawing between the head baker and the developer and between the developer and the other developers enables them to actively proliferate the tacit knowledge of the head baker. Additionally, they were able to do so in a manner that allowed developers to construct episodes specific to a bread-kneading machine.
The context-specific nature of this mechanism makes it highly effective. As just shown, an assumption of abstraction or conversion (Nonaka 1991) is not very helpful when trying to understand the proliferation of tacit knowledge. The head baker's tacit knowledge continues to be an unarticulated background, never to be made explicit. It can simply be reflected upon when directing the attention of others in an effort to empower them to act in a similar manner yet based on their own, distinctive, ineffable background of episodes with similar goals, interpretations and responses. The process is ubiquitous and episodic, thus enabling us all to communicate and sensemake in a fundamentally similar manner.
Thus, a master baker with numberless experiences of kneading dough can communicate to developers who presumably have no experience with kneading dough, but have numberless experiences of designing machines. Attention-drawing (Tsoukas 2003) that occurs between two people simply works to bracket cues and experiences (Weick 1995) . It works because both the person directing attention and the person attending are experiencing the world episodically. This enables them to help each other to focus attention on specific stimuli, interpret these stimuli, and respond, given a specific and seemingly common goal.
The Proliferation of Tacit Knowledge at the Team Level
How, though, does this scale to teams? How can tacit knowledge, which is presumed to be personal, proliferate within a team? The episodic mechanism described above continues to be our foundation when explaining the proliferation of knowledge within a team. To illustrate, we pick up where we left off in the previous section and focus on the team-based process involved in the actual design of the bread machine. We assume that the machine is similar to most bread machines and involves paddles/blades that work to knead the dough. We also assume that the developers have the necessary know-how about kneading dough that is required to design a machine capable of performing this activity.
Applying assumption 1, we assume that the construction and relating of tacit knowledge is episodic. The difference in regard to teams, of course, is the higher potential for multiple goals (for example, one developer focuses on the materials from which to build the mixing blades, another developer focuses on the components required for the necessary movement, another developer focuses on the power device for the machine, and so on), more stimuli (for example, the responses of each developer at each step of the design process, the number of distinct raw materials required, the compilation of moving parts, and so on), a wider array of interpretations of stimuli, given a larger number of individuals involved, and many more potential types of responses for the same reason.
In regard to assumption 2, we assume that the attention-drawing process remains pivotal. Now, however, the developers must direct their attention so that it results in complementary responses while simultaneously directing their attention to each other given the different experiences, thus potentially different responses or actions, of each developer in regard to the same stimuli (for example, the physical or computer-animated machine prototype). These stimuli are constantly changing throughout development as new ideas are incorporated into the design. Like the student-driver, what becomes peripheral and what becomes focal to each developer will depend on the number of relatable episodes each developer has constructed. For example, the movement of the mixing blades might first be interpreted in more mechanical terms of how the mixing blades move at each step in the process. Eventually it must be thought of in terms of the overall bread-kneading movement, once a necessary number of episodes specific to the mechanics of the mixing blade of this machine are constructed.
One of the roles of each developer is to draw the attention of the other developers to salient stimuli, given the knowledge of individuals and the collective actions of the team. For example, the power-device developer might point out to the blade-materials developer that the weight of the mixing blades matters in the overall design. Similarly, the blade-materials developer might point out to the power-device developer that there is maximum speed at which the mixing blades can move, beyond which the blades will bend or break, given the potential of dryer dough and the inherent strength of the mixing blades.
Each developer draws upon episodes specific to her design role. The episodes being constructed by each developer will obligatorily become more congruent with the episodes of other developers because of the common influence of the mechanical outcome on the goals, stimuli attended to, interpretation of those stimuli, and the value placed on the outcome, given the function of the machine and their complementary knowledge of optimal dough-kneading. Thus, the team is guided by individuals' tacit knowledge of how to properly knead dough and individuals' tacit knowledge in regard to design.
Given assumption 3, we assume that as new prototypes are developed, each developer will assume goals, focus on stimuli, interpret these stimuli and respond in a manner that is more complementary to the rest of the team by virtue of their shared experiences. The team can be assured that, if a critical mass of episodes has been constructed by each developer in regard to the development of this machine or the development of other mechanical devices that have similar properties, the developers are obliged to relate to these episodes. These episodes will ensure that attention remains directed on the appropriate stimuli and responses throughout the development process. The team is able to collectively evaluate each design based on whether or not the episodes constructed as a result of observing the dynamics of the machine are similar enough with each individual's episodes that relate to how to knead dough. Thus, the developers are able to make a relatively simple comparison: Are the experiences of dough-kneading similar enough between the human and machine scenarios? The prototype is either going to produce dough that is similar enough or not. If not, then the design process continues unless other constraints (for example, financial, market timing, and so on) require otherwise.
Episodes are the foundation upon which shared experiences are based (Weick 1995) . These experiences are the seeds from which knowledge-based communities grow (Wenger 1998; Brown and Duguid 2000) . To extend this example further, the molecular process of attention-drawing continues to be leveraged as each developer moves on to become a manager. The tacit knowledge related to the experience of designing the bread-making machine proliferates as new managers affect the actions of more employees via the process of attention-drawing described above. The process of attention-drawing ensures a functional amount of continuity in tacit knowledge as it assumes relatedness among episodes that are obligatorily tied to that which one is attending (for example, the kneading of dough, the acceleration of a car, the reading of this journal article).
The degree of difference between new and past episodes becomes a matter of function. That is, only knowledge that proves practical through practice will proliferate. In this sense, tacit knowledge is socially constructed, albeit episodic. It is potentially the processes put in place and the practices promoted by organizations that affect this constructive process, thus ultimately having a large impact on the proliferation of tacit knowledge.
Conclusion
This paper puts forth a perspective characterized by three propositions. First, the nature of tacit knowledge is episodic; we assumed that it is acquired through experience. Second, experience results from the construction or relating of episodes. Third, the proliferation of tacit knowledge within an organization is the result of a constructive and collaborative process by which two or more individuals collectively focus attention, thus collectively construct and relate episodes. The crux of this perspective is composed of three fundamental assumptions. First, the constructing and relating of tacit knowledge is episodic. Second, constructing new episodes is obligatory upon attention. Third, relating to past episodes is obligatory upon attention.
We have written this paper with the goal of informing practices that promote the proliferation of tacit knowledge. We do not presume to have presented a complete picture in this regard and recognize the ongoing nature of this discussion. Thus, we finish with a sampling of theoretical and applied questions to guide future thought and research.
For example, what constitutes an episode that is similar enough? Are episodes more relatable in regard to goals, stimuli, interpretations of these stimuli or responses? If experience has an effect on the probability of specific actions, given a set of stimuli, need this imply that behavior tied to tacit knowledge is more of a probabilistic event? Is the relationship between episodes and tacit knowledge a qualitative or quantitative matter, or both? How should we best characterize the boundaries of episodes (for example, time, goals, a number of stimuli, interpretations, or actions)? In regard to groups, can efficiencies be gained by affecting the qualitative nature of each shared experience, thus reducing the time necessary to produce a given outcome? How do the implications in regard to the probabilistic nature of behavior scale to the team or organizational level?
In this paper we have attempted to further the discussion on tacit knowledge by going beyond the perspective that relegates it to being forever personal, thus seemingly locked within the minds of individuals. We know, however, that in everyday life, lessons are learned, skills are acquired, trades and traditions are passed on, and some behaviors become visibly and measurably more reliable simply through social interaction and/or shared experiences. The seemingly solitary tacit-world becomes more social and fluid upon the realization that individuals are tied together by the nature in which they experience the world. Since every individual experiences the world episodically, we are able through relatively intuitive actions to connect, convey and represent our tacit-worlds in a sociably meaningful and systematically reliable manner.
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